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With the inauguration of Joe Biden, the United States once again extends 
its hand to – relieved but wary – traditional partners and embraces the con-
cept of strategic competition with Russia and China. The European Union 
sees more room for cooperation especially with China, which may, howev-
er, come with significant long-term costs. The hardening of fronts between 
democratic and authoritarian countries seems likely.
 • Even though the US wants to “earn back its position of trusted leadership,” 
the EU and other partners have become wary of the North American country’s 
reliability, as the political forces that brought Donald Trump to the presidency 
remain strong. Further, even though the US is pushing for a tougher stance 
against China, the EU is rather divided and has vested interests in continuing 
cooperation.
 • China and Russia have become increasingly aggressive, as the Crimea annexa-
tion, building of artificial islands with military bases in the South China Sea, 
and border clashes between Indian and Chinese military all showcase. China 
is increasingly weaponizing its economic power to exert influence on foreign 
countries such as Australia and continues to deny the existence of human rights 
abuses at home. 
 • Selective decoupling by the US, and to some extent by the EU, has started. The 
latter for example recently established the European Raw Materials Alliance to 
become less dependent on imports.
 • The search for values-based alliances has begun as well. For instance, France 
and Germany initiated the Alliance for Multilateralism in 2019 to strengthen 
the rules-based international order. Partnerships with non-traditional allies 
from the Global South are crucial to help the multilateral liberal order survive, 
although it may lead to bloc-building between democratic and authoritarian 
regimes.
Policy Implications
The rise of China will be the key determinant of international politics for decades 
to come. Continuing to cooperate with the country may come at great risk, as it 
helps an authoritarian regime to attain the status of global superpower – one 
that does not share democratic values and dismisses international law. The EU 
– but also other countries – will likely need to choose between emphasising a 
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Resetting Multilateralism
In January 2021 Joe Biden was sworn in as the new president of the United States. 
His political programme stands in stark contrast to that of his predecessor, Donald 
Trump, both domestically as well as internationally. The “America First” dogma, 
many said, had come to an end. The crisis of multilateralism – traditional backers 
withdrawing their support and a rising China challenging the rules-based interna-
tional order – can be resolved with the US now its champion once again.
Indeed, the Biden administration has been busy extending its hand to European 
partners, recommitted to the World Health Organization, and re-entered the Paris 
Agreement. At the Munich Security Conference in February 2021, the new president 
stressed that the US is determined to re-engage, consult with Europe, and that the 
country wanted “to earn back our position of trusted leadership” (Biden 2021). To-
gether, both Europe and the US must show that the democratic model is the best 
means of confronting the global challenges of today, and they must stand together 
in taking on “strategic competitor” China (as well as Russia). He also stressed that 
this competition is not about a conflict of East versus West: it should not bar coop-
eration on common issues such as pandemics and climate change. This speech was 
clearly intended to reinvigorate some of the lost confidence of the Western world in 
its own continued importance (the title of the previous MSC conference in 2020 – 
“Westlessness” – may speak for itself). It was also intended as a message to China 
and Russia that the West is back, and that it will not shy away from (non-military) 
confrontation. 
The world that Biden envisioned in his speech may not, however, be the one hu-
manity is heading towards. The assertion that East versus West competition is not 
about bloc-building may even be the best indicator that, indeed, the world is head-
ing exactly in this direction. With Xi Jinping tightening his grip on power (he now 
can remain president for life), China has become increasingly aggressive towards 
other countries, as its “wolf warrior diplomacy,” island-building in the South China 
Sea, and border clashes with neighbouring India all showcase. It is also increasingly 
using its economic power to exert influence on foreign countries such as Australia, 
continues to deny the existence of human rights abuses in the Xinjiang region, and 
is building new nuclear-missile bases. The tone of the new US administration to-
wards China has been harsh, and Sino–US relations have starkly deteriorated since 
Biden took office, with China showing no signs of bowing to US pressure. While the 
US continues to openly challenge China and rallies its allies to follow suit, the Euro-
pean Union is more divided and, so far at least, has mostly remained willing to see 
the authoritarian country as a partner as well as a competitor. Other countries may 
already be strategically choosing with which bloc they will cooperate – a democratic 
West or an authoritarian China.
Two Competing Narratives on Multilateralism
One can identify two broad narratives on multilateralism: “reanimate and rein-
force” and “restructure” respectively (Narlikar 2021). The first identifies deviations 
from the rules-based order by individual states as the root cause of the multilateral 
system’s recent problems in effectively handling global challenges. Consequently, 
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solving current problems simply requires more commitment by individual states: 
for example by increased funding for institutions such as the WHO, or by reforming 
deadlocked ones such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
The second narrative, “restructure,” calls for fundamental revision of the mul-
tilateral order, as it was the current system that led to a crisis of multilateralism in 
the first place. For instance, the promotion of global value chains by the WTO has 
created opportunities to weaponize interdependency (Farrell and Newman 2019). 
The rules need to be adapted to account for the fact that hostile actors can exploit 
economic ties. This second narrative emphasises national interests, weaponised in-
terdependence, and values as fundamental guidelines for foreign policy, and sug-
gests the formation alliances of like-minded states in specific areas of cooperation 
– that is, partial and gradual decoupling from rivals alongside deeper integration 
with trusted partners (Narlikar 2021). 
While the EU seems to be more inclined to follow the first narrative, “rean-
imate and reinforce,” the US seems set to follow the second instead – although 
there are some signs that the EU is now shifting its stance slightly. For instance, 
at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in June 2021 the heads 
of states agreed to update the military alliance’s strategic concept for the first time 
since 2010. The threats posed by Russia and China to security and the rules-based 
international order featured prominently in the meeting’s communiqué. Mean-
while, China is gaining influence vis-à-vis moulding the multilateral order: It heads 
four out of 15 specialised agencies, is the second-largest contributor to the United 
Nations budget, and can count on the support of many lower-income countries – 
in part due to their dependency on Chinese credit. From a values-based perspec-
tive, it is highly problematic that an authoritarian country, one with proven human 
rights abuses (see, for example, Zenz 2020), is gaining such a powerful position 
within global multilateral decision-making. The “reanimate and reinforce” narra-
tive seems to be founded on the hope that China will someday commit to basing its 
foreign policy on international law – something that remains highly questionable.
US–China Competition
The main concern on the international stage, as seen from the vantage point of the 
US, can be simplified down to the following: An authoritarian regime with tremen-
dous digital-surveillance capabilities is on its way to becoming a superpower and 
therewith rival to US supremacy, acting increasingly aggressively in the process. 
This is seen as both dangerous from a security perspective as well as undesirable 
from a normative point of view. Further, its economic relationship with China is 
widely regarded as unfavourable for the North American country. The US wants to 
rein in the authoritarian regime. 
The first high-level diplomatic meeting between the Chinese and the Biden ad-
ministrations in March 2021 began with a war of words. The US secretary of state 
accused China of threatening the “rules-based order that maintains global stabil-
ity,” while the head of the Chinese delegation accused the US of a “Cold War men-
tality” and of agitating other countries to “attack” China (Sevastopulo and Mitch-
ell 2021). Both before the meeting and since, the two sides would apply multiple 
tit-for-tat sanctions on individuals. Meanwhile, the US has breathed new life into 
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the QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), a strategic dialogue on security issues 
mainly intended to curb the growing influence of China. Made up of the US, Japan, 
Australia, and India, QUAD published a statement in early 2021 in which its mem-
ber countries proclaimed “a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific” (QUAD 
2021), and also invited representatives of New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam 
to attend a QUAD Plus meeting. 
The US strategy – continuously voicing concerns over human rights abuses and 
military activity, as well as increased co-ordination with (potential) allies – has so 
far not been effective in changing Chinese behaviour. On the contrary, the latter 
has pushed back not only with propaganda (such as emphasising systemic supe-
riority in handling the COVID-19 pandemic) but also continues with, for example, 
its military incursions into Taiwan’s air defence identification zones. The Chinese 
wish for reunification – or annexation – is widely regarded as the most imminent 
factor likely to give rise to a war between the two superpowers, as Biden has repeat-
edly emphasised that US support for Taiwan remains steadfast. In June, a military 
plane landed in Taiwan for the first time since 1995, bringing with it a delegation of 
both Republican and Democratic members of Congress, provoking an outcry among 
Chinese officials and further incursions by Chinese aircraft. A senior Chinese diplo-
mat recently commented that Sino–US relations are at a “deadlock” (Mitchell and 
Sevastopulo 2021).
The EU Is Trying to Find Its Own Position
One could almost hear the sigh of relief in most European capitals when the re-
sults of the US elections were announced. At last, the erratic foreign policy of the 
outgoing Trump had come to an end. However, even if the current US administra-
tion does manage to assume a leadership position in the West once more, recent 
developments in domestic politics have made traditional partners wary. There is 
no guarantee that US leadership will not eventually revert back to a foreign policy à 
la Trump, as the political forces that previously brought the latter to power remain 
strong. The next presidential elections might bring with them another US with-
drawal from multilateralism. For now, both sides seem able to reach compromises 
on difficult-to-solve foreign policy issues – as the agreement on the Nord Stream 2 
situation or the recently announced global agreement for corporate taxes showcase. 
However, the hasty removal of NATO troops from Afghanistan also highlights a lack 
of common strategic planning. Further, EU member states are seeking more strate-
gic autonomy: French president Emmanuel Macron recently called for the EU to as-
sume more responsibility for the security issues in its neighbourhood, for instance. 
The EU (or most of it) views China as a partner as well as a competitor and 
strategic rival, with some countries emphasising the partnership and others the ri-
valry. In recent months, the position seems to have shifted somewhat towards out-
and-out rivalry – at least in Brussels. After tit-for-tat sanctions against individuals 
that started with the EU imposing such measures on Chinese officials for their in-
volvement in running internment camps in the Xinjiang region, the ratification of 
the Comprehensive Investment Agreement (under negotiation since 2013) is now 
on hold. Further, some individual EU member states have recently moved away 
from China. Italy has shifted its focus away from Chinese investments, and towards 
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Europe and the US instead, under new prime minister Mario Draghi for instance 
(Johnson, Ghiglione, and Sciorilli 2021). 
Germany recently published a White Paper on Multilateralism (The Federal 
Government 2021), in which it underscores its determination to defend a rules-
based multilateral order, denounces violations of international law and the weak-
ening of the institutions that enforce it, and lays out a strategy to strengthen the 
multilateral system by supporting existing institutions like the UN, initiating re-
forms, and resorting to alliances with like-minded partners where necessary. Still, 
even though China features prominently in this strategy paper, a clear stance on the 
difficult trade-off between security concerns and economic opportunities is missing. 
National elections in September 2021 will likely not lead to a change in Germany’s 
position towards China. Armin Laschet, frontrunner for the chancellorship of the 
German CDU, recently emphasised that China is as much an ally as it is a systemic 
rival. Likewise Olaf Scholz, frontrunner of the SPD, does not seem to be willing 
to confront the authoritarian regime either. However the Greens, who also have a 
shot at government participation under Annalena Baerbock, seem to be willing to 
engage in systemic conflict with authoritarian regimes according to their election 
programme. It remains to be seen how much of the latter the Greens will be able 
to push through in a potential coalition with the CDU, SPD, and/or other parties.
Economic interests contribute to the EU’s view that China also needs to be seen 
as a partner, as it is the bloc’s second-biggest trading partner. So far, the relation-
ship has been asymmetrical, with the EU granting (state-subsidised) Chinese firms 
access to its markets, while China remains relatively closed to foreign actors, capi-
tal, as well as ideas (Benner et al. 2018). Rising geopolitical tensions are already 
affecting the operations of European businesses currently in China, but in a way 
different to the one that might be expected. Many have deepened their engagement 
in China despite the continuation of forced technology transfers (Liu and Liu 2021). 
Close to 60 per cent of European businesses are expanding their operations in Chi-
na according to the European Chamber of Commerce. Part of the reason for this 
expansion is to separate supply chains and move as many of them as possible into 
China itself in order to retain access to this lucrative market going forwards – with 
many firms expecting a decoupling of economic ties between China and the US, and 
possibly between China and the EU too. This increased engagement by European 
firms likely exacerbates the EU’s reluctance to take a tougher stance against China. 
On the one hand, there are increasing signs that the bloc is seeking to lessen 
its dependence on China at least in strategically important industries such as the 
production of semiconductors and rare earths; most countries have banned the 
Chinese technology firm Huawei from contributing to the roll-out of 5G networks 
too. Processes in other policy areas are underway as well. Germany, during its EU 
Council Presidency, initiated the development of a Strategic Compass for security 
and defence, seeking to establish a common understanding of foreign threats to the 
EU among member states, and to explore ways in which the bloc can be a security 
provider. On the other hand, large countries (like Germany) are clinging to the idea 
of treating China as both a partner and a rival due to vested interests. Still other 
EU members, most notably Eastern European countries, have even deepened their 
cooperation with China via the “16+1” initiative, a Chinese forum used to strike 
deals with individual countries with an emphasis on investment in infrastructure 
and advanced technologies. A divided EU cannot act decisively, which is probably 
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in China’s interest (for an overview of China’s influencing efforts in and on Europe, 
see Benner et al. 2018).
The Search for Like-Minded Partners Has Begun
Aligning with like-minded countries beyond traditional partners will prove neces-
sary for both the US and EU to successfully defend a values-based international 
order. The search for new partners is especially important in case the US once again 
withdraws. To sway other countries, to regain some of the recently lost political 
capital, and to outcompete China as a development model, the actions of the EU 
and the US need to be consistent with their core values to inspire the trust on which 
alliances can be built. They also need to deliver solutions to concrete problems. Pro-
viding rapid access to COVID-19 vaccines to countries of the Global South would, 
for instance, send a strong signal. 
Initiatives like the QUAD, the Alliance for Multilateralism (an informal net-
work of like-minded states launched by France and Germany), or the German White 
Paper on Multilateralism – which specifically emphasises that more and more 
countries are making legitimate claims to having a say in and helping to shape the 
international order, and that civil society is also calling for greater participation too 
– indicate that that the search for partners is underway. The forming of alliances 
also indicates that bloc-building – with democracies on the one side and authoritar-
ian regimes on the other – has started. For instance, China was very quick to estab-
lish friendly relations with the Taliban after the withdrawal of NATO troops in Au-
gust 2021. Other countries may already be strategically choosing their alignments. 
Confronting the Challenges of the Tectonic Shift in Geopolitics
The multilateral liberal order is undergoing a tectonic shift due to China’s rise. Its 
increasingly aggressive behaviour rightfully worries both countries in the latter’s 
immediate neighbourhood and beyond. Taking past behaviour as an indication of 
future choices, one has every reason to believe that China will continue to break 
promises and rules at will. While the US is willing to confront the authoritarian 
regime rather openly under Biden, it may be time for the EU to toughen its stance, 
as it seems risky to continue making deals such as the Comprehensive Investment 
Agreement. Such deals convey legitimacy and contribute to China’s economic rise, 
while it remains questionable whether the latter will keep up its end of the bargain. 
Selective decoupling may come with some economic costs (see also, Felbermayr 
et al. 2021). However, gains in security and the survival of liberal values may well 
compensate for this (see also, Narlikar 2021). 
To develop a more coherent foreign policy and thus be capable of acting ef-
fectively in this new era of multilateralism, the EU needs to overcome its internal 
divisions regarding China policy. This entails acknowledging the changes in the 
geopolitical landscape, reassessing the one-sided relationship with China, as well 
as convincing member states that a united EU also lies in their own interest in this 
new era of multilateralism. The EU should urge members of the 16+1 format to fol-
low Lithuania in abandoning the China-led initiative. One way to foster a common 
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policy stance would be to strengthen existing dialogue processes as well as establish 
new ones, both within and among states, on how to balance the sometimes-difficult 
trade-off between a values-based foreign policy and a pragmatic one. Another way 
forward may be to remove the need for unanimity: Heiko Maas, Germany’s foreign 
minister, recently argued that the EU must abandon the veto right for its foreign 
policy to become capable of acting (Maas 2021), but such a move seems out of reach 
for the foreseeable future, and may be counterproductive to fostering unity among 
member states.
Another reason to rethink the engagement with China – and especially the view 
that one can cooperate in some areas while competing in others – is the risk that 
domains wherein cooperation is needed will subsequently be used as leverage in 
other policy arenas. Take, for instance, the issue of greenhouse gas emissions. Chi-
na continues to build coal-fired power plants, adding around 3 per cent capacity per 
year, and produced more than half of the world’s total coal-fired electricity in 2020 
(IEA 2020). Its carbon-market scheme is expected to yield only limited reductions 
in greenhouse gas emissions meanwhile (Gray 2021). Taking China at its word that 
it will reduce carbon emissions allows the Chinese administration to make reduc-
tions conditional on concessions in other policy areas. Instead, the US, the EU, and 
other partners could form a “climate club” with a common carbon border adjust-
ment mechanism, and thereby economically incentivise China to reduce emissions 
while taking away a lever through which the latter can impose its will upon others 
(see also, Erickson and Collins 2021). 
At the same time, one should be careful not to close the door on cooperation 
completely, as this may result in open conflict. Yet, the spectre of war should not 
lead to overly cautious behaviour: While hedging risks by avoiding a tougher stance 
on China may seem like a sensible strategy that protects the EU’s economic inter-
ests and avoids confrontation, it also helps the authoritarian regime to surpass the 
US and become the new global superpower – one openly dismissive of the idea 
of universal human rights. The real-world consequences hereof are impossible to 
predict. From a values-based perspective, however, such an outcome is extremely 
undesirable.
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